逻辑-信念冲突与推理难度对逻辑和信念判断的影响

The Effects of Logic-Belief Conflict and Problem Difficulty on Logic and Belief Judgment

双加工理论框架下的平行竞争模型和默认干涉模型对推理过程中启发式和分析式加工的启动次序和相互作用的性质提出了不同假设。本研究通过考察被试在信念判断和逻辑判断两种指导语下解决不同难度和不同类型推理问题的正确率和反应时,对两个模型的预测进行了检验。实验结果表明,解决简单问题时,问题类型对信念判断有显著影响,对逻辑判断无显著影响;解决复杂问题时,问题类型对逻辑判断的影响显著大于对信念判断的影响。实验结果支持平行竞争模型的假设,即两类加工在推理过程中同时启动,共同竞争最终的推理反应。

Dual-processing theories dominate contemporary research on human reasoning. Although the various instantiations of dual-processing theories somewhat differ in terms of their architectural assumptions, they all posit that reasoning reflects a sophisticated interplay between heuristic processes, which are fast, automatic, and require little cognitive capacity. Analytic processes are slow, controlled, and draw heavily on working memory. Despite the fact that dual processing assumptions have gained support from a wide range of sources, there is little consensus as to the details of the interaction between the two kinds of operations. The Default-Interventional Model and the Parallel-Competition Model make different assumptions about the sequencing of heuristic and analytic processes. Both models have gained some support but cannot capture the full range of the available data. The aim of the current study is to test the predictive power of the two models. The current study examined the impact of the belief-logic conflict on the accuracy and latency of responses from participants who were asked to solve simple transitive reasoning and complex syllogistic reasoning problems. Participants were instructed to evaluate the conclusions of logical arguments on the basis of either their logical validity or their believability. Both transitive and syllogistic reasoning items included conflict problems （valid and unbelievable conclusion/invalid and believable conclusion items） and non-conflict problems （valid and believable conclusion/invalid and unbelievable conclusion items）. Each trial consisted of the presentation of the premises alone; participants then pressed the space bar on a key-board. The premises disappeared and were replaced by an instruction cue, a conclusion and response options. Latency of response was recorded from the presentation of the conclusion on the screen until a response was provided. The results showed that belief-logic conflict influenced participants＇ belief judgments when they solved simple problems, but belief-logic conflict had no effects on the participants＇ logical judgments. The accuracy of the participants＇ belief judgments on conflict items was higher than that of the participants＇ belief judgments on non-conflict ones; the response latency of the participants＇ belief judgments on conflict items was longer than that of the participants＇ belief judgments on non-conflict ones. Moreover, when participants solved difficult problems, belief-logic conflict had a significantly larger effect on latencies for logic judgments than on belief judgments. In short, the presence of a conflict between logic and belief had a much larger effect on belief judgments than on logic judgments of simple problems, while the belief-logic conflict had a larger effect on logic judgment than on belief judgment of diffficult problems. There was no evidence to support the predictions derived from the principles that underlie the Default- Interventionist Model, but the Parallel-Competitive Model can capture the data pattern of the study. The results of the experiment are in alignment with the Parallel-Competitive Model and suggest that heuristic and analytic processes can be activated simultaneously in the course of reasoning to compete for the final response, a response which may need to be inhibited in favor of an alternative with a less rapidly cued response, depending on the task instructions and task difficulty.