摘要
研究当上游制造商面临碳交易机制而采取碳减排行动使得下游制造商的生产成本上升的冲突型两级低碳供应链的协调问题。假设上游制造商和下游制造商之间为Stackelberg博弈,其中上游制造商为主导者,下游制造商为跟随者。考虑分散决策、集中决策、生产成本共担和减排收益共享契约下的分散决策4种情形并利用逆向归纳法求解。研究结果表明:冲突行为越激烈,减排效率越低且商品零售价格越高;引入契约后分散供应链的最优投资没有变化,仍然无法达到集中供应链的最优投资;单一的生产成本共担契约或者减排收益共享契约无法实现供应链参与约束更无法达到激励相容约束,根本原因是共担的成本或者共享的减排收益会通过批发价机制进行转移,故而该供应链难以实现协调。
This paper studied the coordination of the conflicting two-echeon low carbon supply chain consisting of upstream and downstream manufacturers.The conflict was defined that the upstream manufacturer takes action for carbon emissions reduction under carbon trading mechanism while the downstream manufacturer's production cost rises.It assumed for the Stackelberg game that the upstream manufacturer plays as a leader and the down-stream manufacturer does as a follower.Four kinds of situation of decentralized decision making,centralized de-cision-making,the production cost sharing contract and the carbon emissions reduction revenue sharing contract under decentralized decision making were considered and the way of backward induction was used to solve.The results show that the more intense the conflict is,the lower the efficiency of carbon emissions reduction is and the higher the retail price is.The optimal investment of the decentralized supply chain under the two contracts is un-changed and still lower than that of the centralized supply chain.The participation constraint and incentive com-patibility constraint cannot achieve with the single production cost sharing contract or the carbon emissions reduc-tion revenue sharing contract.The root cause is that the sharing cost or carbon emissions reduction sharing reve-nue will transfer through the wholesale price mechanism.Therefore,it is difficult to coordinate for this supply chain.
出处
《铁道科学与工程学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第5期1000-1006,共7页
Journal of Railway Science and Engineering
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关资助项目(10JZD0020)
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71431006)
中国博士后基金资助项目(2014M562145)
关键词
碳减排
冲突行为
供应链协调
Carbon emissions reduction
conflict
supply chain coordination