“先扬后抑”的盈余预测:现象、原因及后果

Analyst OP Reports： Phenomena, Causes, and Consequences

本文以我国2001--2010年配股和公开增发的上市公司为研究样本，研究了证券分析师发布OP报告（即在首次盈余预测时发布乐观报告而在末次盈余预测时发布悲观报告）的存在性及其动机。研究发现：证券分析师的这种“先扬后抑”的现象仅存在于国有企业样本中；而且在国有企业样本中，证券分析师出具OP报告的动机是获取私有信息，进而提高预测准确性。并且，当上市公司私有信息价值较高时，证券分析师更倾向于发布OP报告以取悦管理层来获取私有信息。此外，对国有企业发布OP报告的证券分析师进入“新财富最佳证券分析师”榜单的概率较高。本文的研究结论能够帮助我们更好地理解证券分析师的预测行为，并且有利于投资者做出合理的投资决策，对于监管机构出台有效的信息披露监管和约束政策也具有一定的借鉴意义。

Using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2001 to 2010, we study the existence and motivation that analyst issuing OP （Optimistic/Pessimistic） reports. We find that the OP phenomena only exist in state-owned listed companies. Further analysis shows that analysts who issue OP reports produce more accurate earnings forecasts by catering to management to obtain private information and analyst＇s forecasts are more accurate when the value of private information is higher in the process of rights issue and SEO. Moreover, ana lysts issuing OP reports increase the probability of entering into New Fortune Best Analyst Rankings in SOE. This study helps us better understand the behavior of analysts＇ forecasts, and helps investors make rational decisions. At the same time, the conclusion of the paper has policy implications for regulatory agencies to establish more effective information supervision and policy.