银行股权关联、融资约束与资本投资行为

Bank Equity Connections, Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment

银行的股权多元化改革使得越来越多的企业持有银行股份，形成了企业对银行的股权关联关系。这种关系既可能降低企业的融资约束，也可能增加经理人对自由现金流的滥用，进而对公司资本投资行为产生影响。本文发现，与没有银行股权关联的公司相比，拥有银行股权关联的公司其投资一现金流敏感性更低，说明银行股权关联更可能降低融资约束而非增加自由现金流；进一步地，银行股权关联关系能够缓解由融资约束而产生的投资不足行为，且其作用机理在民营上市公司和制度环境较好的地区更加显著；对后续资本投资的价值效应进行检验发现，银行股权关联提高了资本投资的价值，但同样只在民营上市公司和制度环境较好的地区显著。结果显示，银行股权关联能够缓解投资不足和提高投资价值，但其作用的发挥依赖于产权性质和制度环境。本文结论对当下正在进行的民营资本参与银行业实践的改革具有启示作用。

Along with the recent banking industry reform, more and more industrial firms chose to hold equity ownership in the Chinese banks, thus building the bank equity con- nections. Our results show that, comparing with firms without bank equity connections, firms with connections have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity, suggesting that the con- nections can decrease firms＇ financial constraints. Additional tests show that the bank equity connection can relieve the inadequate investment caused by the firms＇ financial constraints, but this phenomenon only exists in non-SOEs and firms located in areas with better institu- tional environments. Overall, our results support that bank equity ownership play an impor- tant role in firms＇ financing and investment. Our findings thus also support that the current banking industry reform benefits our economy.