摘要
With the help of professionally trained agricultural scientists, the Guomindang＇s Nationalist government drafted a large-scale program for agricultural reconstruction in the late 1920s and early 1930s. At the heart of the program was a scientific rice-breeding experiment with the potential to produce great numbers of new high-yield rice varieties. However, this scientific achievement could not assure success of the new rice varieties in the market because the marketability of rice was determined not by the scientific productivity improvement but by a series of processes required before the rice reached consumers. For this, local and practical contexts had to be considered. By juxtaposing two different forms of ＂rice expertise,＂ this paper illuminates the incompatibility between the state＇s productivist understanding of agricultural improvement and the quality issue in the grain market.
With the help of professionally trained agricultural scientists, the Guomindang＇s Nationalist government drafted a large-scale program for agricultural reconstruction in the late 1920s and early 1930s. At the heart of the program was a scientific rice-breeding experiment with the potential to produce great numbers of new high-yield rice varieties. However, this scientific achievement could not assure success of the new rice varieties in the market because the marketability of rice was determined not by the scientific productivity improvement but by a series of processes required before the rice reached consumers. For this, local and practical contexts had to be considered. By juxtaposing two different forms of ＂rice expertise,＂ this paper illuminates the incompatibility between the state＇s productivist understanding of agricultural improvement and the quality issue in the grain market.
