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基于进化博弈的高校廉政风险防控机理 被引量:1

Risk Prevention and Control Mechanism of Clean and Honest Administration in Universities Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
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摘要 基于高校廉政风险防控体系三方主体行为分析的基础上,运用进化博弈理论和系统动力学理论,建立了高校廉政风险防控体系进化博弈模型,进而通过算例模拟计算,分析了该模型的稳定性,探讨了高校廉政风险防控体系中影响三方主体博弈的因素,并对每个因素的影响机理进行了分析,指出了高校廉政风险防控系统的进化方向,提出了可行性的建议和思路。 Based on the analysis of the three main bodies' behaviors in risk prevention and control system of clean and honest administration in universities, using the theories of evolutionary game and system dynamics, an evolutionary game model is established. Its stability is analyzed by analogous calculation. Factors which influence the three main bodies competing against each other are discussed. The influence mechanism of each factor is analyzed respectively. The direction for the development of risk prevention and control system of clean and honest administration in universities is pointed out. Feasible suggestions and ideas are finally put forward.
出处 《系统工程》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2015年第11期113-120,共8页 Systems Engineering
基金 湖南省社科基金资助项目(CGB001)
关键词 高校廉政 进化博弈 风险防控 机理 Clean and Honest Administration in Universities Evolutionary Game Theory Risk Prevention and Control Mechanism
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