考虑消费者止步行为的供应链收益共享契约

Revenue-sharing Contract in Supply Chain with Customer Balking

将消费者的止步行为引入到供应链契约中,进而研究了考虑消费者止步行为的供应链收益共享契约。在考虑零售商缺货损失以及消费者的止步行为给零售商带来损失的情况下,求出了不同决策方式下零售商的最优订货量,研究了如何利用收益共享契约协调供应链的问题。在此基础上,进一步分析了零售商缺货损失以及消费者的止步行为对供应商的决策造成的影响。研究发现:在收益共享契约下,供应商提供的批发价格会随着零售商缺货损失以及消费者止步损失的增大而增大。最后,通过数值例子对所得的结论进行了验证。

This paper develops revenue-sharing contract coordination model in a two-stage supply chain system with customer balking and penalties for stockout and customer balking. It calculates the retailer＇s optimal order quantity under centralized decision making situation and decentralized decision making situation. Furthermore, it analyzes the influence of stockout penalty and balking penalty on the decision of the supplier. The results show that： the wholesale price that the supplier offered in the revenue-sharing contract will be increased with the addition of stockout penalty or balking penalty. At last, a numerical example is used to verify the results.