从透明性能不能、该不该走向罗素式意向主义

Could or Should an Intentionalist Argue from Transparency for Russellianism?

透明性论证被认为是对意向主义的有力支持,许多人进而认为透明性论证支持了罗素式意向主义,对弗雷格式意向主义不利。然而,从经验透明性到罗素式意向主义的论证需要额外的前提。承诺这个额外前提的罗素式意向主义者,为了说明色谱反转,不得不承认世界上存在非自然的性质,与意向主义的还原论动机相悖。因而,从透明性既不能亦不该走向罗素式意向主义。

The argument from transparency is thought as a powerful support for Intentionalism. Many people believe that transparency supports Rus-sellian Intentionalism and refutes Fregean Intentionalism. However, an extra premise is needed to validate the move from transparency to Russellian-ism. A Russellian Intentionalist who admits that extra premise has to permit the existence of unnatural properties to accommodate inverted spectrum,yet such properties are obstacles to naturalizing phenomenal characters, which is a major motive for Intentionalism. The conclusion is that an inten-tionalist could not and should not argue from transparency for Russellian Intentionalism.