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个人自主与响应理由 被引量:5

Personal Autonomy and the Response to Reasons
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摘要 个人自主是当代实践哲学的重要概念,然而关于自主的定义却一直存在许多争论。非实质主义认为,个人自主是一种内容中立的概念,任何欲望只要得到行动者的反思认可就是自主的。实质主义则认为个人自主是一种实质的价值理念,对行动者所处的社会环境和欲望内容都有独特的要求。这两种主张的根本分歧是个人自主是否必须响应理由。响应理由构成了所有自主欲望必须满足的基本要求,个人自主也因此是具有实质要求的价值理念。 Personal autonomy is one of the most important concepts in contemporary practical philosophy, but it is also a controversial concept. The non-substantive theory insists that autonomy is a content-neutral concept rather than substantial value. While the substantive theory claims that per-sonal autonomy is a substantial value with some special requirements to the contents of individuals ' desires. The fundamental disagreement between these two theories is whether the autonomous desire has to response to reasons or not. Therefore, autonomous desires must be responsive to reasons,and personal autonomy thus should be regarded as a substantial value rather than content-neutral concept.
作者 惠春寿
机构地区 浙江大学哲学系
出处 《自然辩证法研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第2期14-18,共5页 Studies in Dialectics of Nature
关键词 自主 反思认可 响应理由 适应性偏好 自我欺骗 personal autonomy reflexive endorsements response to reasons adaptive preference self-deception
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