利益相关者的水资源配置博弈

Game theory in water resources allocation for stakeholders

水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。

The natural river flows are seriously disturbed because of the quasi public goods attributes andexternality of water resources.Based on game theory,non-cooperative model with leader-follower relation-ship is established to analyze the water resources allocation.Because the individual benefit can not reachPareto optimal state,cooperative model is provided for more beneficial to all stakeholders.Cooperativegame increases the total benefits,but reduces leader＇s payoff.It is necessary to allocate benefits from coop-eration to leader.The feasible solution set of benefits allocation is constructed by introducing indifferencecurve of the microeconomics and formation condition of coalition.A fair and efficient allocation is deter-mined using the marginal contribution method from the feasible solution set.The results show that the totalbenefits of cooperative game are more than benefits from non cooperative game and achieve Pareto opti-mum.The leader benefit from cooperation is more than non cooperation benefit,which is advantageous forthe leader to form coalitions.