农村小额信贷信用风险控制研究——基于博弈分析

Research on Credit Risk Control of Rural Microfinance in China——Based on Game Analysis

农村小额信贷是激活农村信贷市场潜力的重要途径,然而信用风险阻碍了农村小额信贷的可持续发展。文章通过构建静态、动态博弈模型对不同假设条件之下农村小额信贷机构和农户借贷行为进行博弈分析,基于博弈结果指出制度不健全是农村小额信贷信用风险形成的主要原因,并从强化农村金融法律约束机制、推进农村信用体系建设、建立农村小额信贷担保机制三方面提出了控制农村小额信贷信用风险的思路。

Rural Microfinance is an important way to activate the credit market potential in rural areas, however, credit risk has hindered the sustainable development of rural microfinance. This paper constructs static and dynamic game model to analyze rural microfinance institutions and farmers borrowing behavior under different assumptions. The game results pointed out that the imperfect system is the main reason of rural micro credit risk, and strengthening the rural fnancial legal restraint mechanism, promoting the rural credit system and establishing rural micro-credit guarantee mechanism are three ways to control credit risk of rural microfinance.