声誉、控制权与博弈均衡——一个关于国有企业经营绩效的博弈分析框架

Reputation,Control Rights and Game Equilibrium A Game Analytical Framework and Application to State-Owned Enterprises

本文在 Vickers 和 Barro 分别对 Kreps 的声誉模型简化处理后的模型基础之上,从国有企业内部经营者与所有者之间博弈关系的角度,构建了国有企业经营者正规的声誉模型——一个非完全信息动态博弈模型,分析了声誉(reputation)对国有企业经营者的激励效应以及声誉与国有企业经营绩效之间的关系。本文的基本结论为:声誉效应是企业经营者的重要激励机制,在声誉效应的激励机制下,国有企业经理人员(尤其是杰出的经营者)手中拥有企业的控制权对企业的运作是有效率的。最后,应用本文模型所给出的分析方法与结论,对国有企业目前存在的令人关注的问题与现象,给出了作者自己的解释,并对声誉机制发挥作用的制度基础进行了分析。

Based on the reputation model of Kreps which was simplified separately by Vickers and Barro in 1986,this paper established a dynamic game model with incomplete information on managers of enterprise.Employing the model,this paper analyzed the reputation incentive effect to mangers of enterprise and explained the relation between the reputation and the performance of state-owned enterprises operation.A result is derived:the reputation is important incentive of managers of enterprises.Finally,with the conclusion of the model,this paper also addressed some phenomena in SOEs,such as 'insiders control',etc..