摘要
我们在本文中研究香港电力产业的管制方案。我们发现管制方案使得被监管的企业的行为朝着对社会不利的方向改变。在标准的收益率管制中,Averch-Johnson 分配效率损失可以部分地被产量增加所带来的好处所抵消。然而在香港由于缺乏对固定资产利用的监督与合理的监管机制,资本投资的增加有可能会导致超额的闲置生产能力而不是更多的产出。结果造成经济效率的双重损失。
In this paper we study the scheme of control regulation in Hong Kong's electricity industry.We find that the scheme of control has changed firm behavior in a socially undesirable direction.In the standard rate-of-return regulation,the Averch-Johnson allocation inefficiency can be offset by the benefit of expanded production.However,in Hong Kong,due to the lack of proper monitoring and control mechanism over fixed assets utilization,increases in capital invest- ment could result in excess idle capacity rather than greater output.Relative to the socially opti- mum solution,they were double whams on economic efficiency.
出处
《产业经济评论（山东）》
2002年第1期72-90,共19页
Review of Industrial Economics
关键词
企业监管
管制方案
电力行业
香港
Regulation
Scheme of Control
Electricity Industry
Hang Kong
