反倾销、国际寡头竞争与战略性贸易政策

Antidumping,International Oligopoly and Strategic Trade Policy

本文认为现实中的反倾销是一种具有不确定性的战略性进口贸易政策,并由此出发研究了反倾销政策对于寡头竞争企业的战略以及进口国和出口国双方福利的影响。与关税政策不同,由于反倾销税征收上不确定,企业可以通过提价来规避,它可能会造成进口国福利的损失;而进口国要通过反倾销政策改善福利,需要使得它难以被规避,这解释了现实中反倾销税的高幅度。这些结果与企业的竞争类型无关。同时本文还分析了面临反倾销税时出口国的最优出口战略性贸易政策。

This article believes that antidumping in living is a some of uncertain strategic trade policy,from this point,we study the effect of antidumping policy on oligopoly firm's strate- gic and the effect of both import-country and export-country's wdfare.Different with tariff poli- cy,because of the uncertain of antidumping policy,the firms can evade it though enhancing price, making the loss of import-country's welfare;if the import-country wants to use antidumping poli- cy to improve its welfare,they needs make these policies hard to evade.This explains why the an- tidumping tariff is high in living.These results have no relation with the kinds of competition.