寡占市场结构、研发创新融资与跨期激励相容契约

A Dynamic Game Model of Intertemporal Equity Financing,Innovation and Strategic Competition

本文通过模型研究了一家创新型企业通过外部股权融资获得所需资金进行差异化产品创新进入一个已被在位者垄断的市场,如果成功进入则通过相继的再融资和再创新进行扩张。我们的结论是,研发投融资者之间的信息非对称导致了道德风险和研发"投资不足",投资者更愿意给第一期创新成功的创业者投资扩张,长期契约在解决研发"投资不足"上比短期契约有效,但存在"跨期激励"问题,在寡占环境下还存在"竞争效应"问题。因而,对创业者的长期激励应当包含四个方面,即静态代理成本、跨期代理成本、竞争效应和私有信息租金。模型弥补了产业组织理论和公司融资理论长期以来各为体系的不足。

Industry organization theory and corporate finance theory has long been two seperated field,we aim to bridge this gap.In our model,an entrepreneur want to enter the market monopolied by an incumbent through outside equity financing and heterogenious product innovation,and if succeed he/she will continue to expand by refinancing and process innova- tion.we got than the long-term incentive to the entrepreneur should contain the static agent costs,the intertemporal agent costs,the competition effects of the incumbent and the private information rents,and it is more efficient than the short-term ones in solving the'under-in- vestment'problem resulting from the moral hazard of the entrepreneur.