摘要
本文将通过模型来分析国有企业在软预算约束下会采取的策略性行为及其后果。经济转型时期,在软预算约束下,面临外部竞争压力的国有企业会有过度投资的冲动,这种过度投资将造成市场外部潜在企业的市场进入障碍,从而维护自己的垄断地位。本文的模型结果表明,只要存在软预算约束,这种过度投资行为就不可避免。
This paper analyzes the strategic behaviors of state-owned enterprises under soft budget constraint during economy transition and the market results.When facing outside competition,the state-owned enterprises under soft budget constraint will have the impulses of over-investment,which create the barriers to entry for outside potential competitors.Thus their monopoly positions will be sustained.Our model demonstrates that the over-investment is inevitable whenever there is soft budget constraint.
出处
《产业经济评论(山东)》
2004年第2期95-104,共10页
Review of Industrial Economics
基金
王文举教授主持的国家社科基金项目"博弈论应用与经济动态模拟研究"阶段成果之一
项目批准号02EJY003
关键词
软预算约束
过度投资
进入障碍
Soft Budget Constraint
Over-investment
Barrier to Entry