合作博弈的一致认可值(英文)

The Consensus Value for Games in Partition Function Form

本文对联盟结构博弈的一致认可值及应用问题进行了分析。这个与一致认可值相关的概念和定理在本文得到扩展。这种价值作为惟一的方程的特点是,满足有效性、完全对称性等特点。通过财富转移,第二个特征被提供出来。而且这种解不仅在一些条件下能够满足个人理性(IR)条件,而且在合作效应和外部性两者之间,能够做到较好的权衡,从而提供了一种有意义的分配共享程序。一个一致认可值的一般解被进一步探讨。最后给出了两个一致认可值的应用:一个是联盟结构中的寡占博奕,一个是关于搭便车者的激励。

This paper studies a generalization of the consensus value(cf.Ju,Borm and Ruys(2004))to the class of partition function form games.The concepts and axi- oms,related to the consensus value,are extended.This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies efficiency,complete symmetry,the quasi-null player prop- erty and additivity.Bymeans of the transfer property,a second characterization is provid- ed.Moreover,it is shown that this value satisfies the individual rationality under a certain condition,and well balances the tradeoff between coalition effects and externality effects. By modifying the stand-alone reduced game,a recursive formula for the value is estab- lished.A further generalization of the consensus value is discussed.Finally,two spplica- tions of the consensus value are given:one is for oligopoly games in partition function form and the other is about participation incentives in free-rider situations.