摘要
自从中国建立市场经济制度以来,一个重要的变化就是实现了从卖方市场向买方市场的转变,并伴随着买方市场地位的增强,出现了买方势力。本文分析了买方势力的来源及其经济效应,并利用双边垄断理论解释了由此产生的抗衡势力。结合当前零售业内的最新发展趋势,构建了博弈模型,分析出抗衡势力的存在确实能降低零售价格,但是与"加尔布雷斯假说"的作用机制不同。最后,结合发达国家对买方垄断的经济管制经验,为中国如何对买方垄断进行管制提出了相应的建议。
Since the market economy was established in China,there is a significant change that the seller market has translated into buyer market,and with the consolidation of the buyer market,it is inclined to reveal buyer power.In this paper,we will analyze the source and its economic effect of buyer power,and explain the emerging countervailing power with bilateral monopoly theory.Combined with the latest trend in retailing industry,we use a multi-stage game model to explain this phenomenon and draw the conclusion that the existence of countervailing power will reduce the retail price,but the underlying mechanism is different from the Galbraith hypothesis.Finally,compared with the economic regulation policy to buyer power in developed countries,we propose some suggestion for the anti-monopsony regulation in China.
出处
《产业经济评论(山东)》
CSSCI
2008年第4期41-57,共17页
Review of Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金"中国产业市场势力的测度及其福利损失的估计"(70673106)的阶段性研究成果。
关键词
买方势力
抗衡势力
双边垄断
经济管制
Buyer Power
Countervailing Power
Bilateral Monopoly
Economic Regulation