基于机会损益的双向接入定价政府规制分析

The Analysis of Two-Way Access Pricing Regulation in Network Industries Based on the Opportunity to Profit and Loss

网络产业放松规制、引入竞争的改革使得"瓶颈"环节和竞争性环节出现"业务分离",从而催生出"接入问题",并成为网络产业规制改革能否成功和有效竞争的关键。在多瓶颈情况下,不同网络企业之间必须实现双向接入才能正常运营。本文有别于以往从合谋角度分析是否应该对双向接入定价进行政府规制的思路,利用接入机会损益分析方法,构建了接入收益分配模型,从接入收益分配角度分析双向接入定价政府规制的必要性。分析结果表明,双向接入有助于提高全网价值。但对小网络价值提高较大,对大网络价值提高较小;若不进行双向接入,小网络的机会损益率要高于大网络;理论上,主导在位企业有理由要求进行不对等结算。

The reforms of deregulation and introduction of competition in network Industries made it possible that'business segmentation'appeared in the'bottleneck'links and competitive links,thus engendering the'access pricing',which becomes the key to the regulatory reforms in network industries and to the effective competition.In multi-bottleneck cases,different networks must be based on two-way access to achieve normal operations.This article is different from the previous analysis which is from the perspective of collusion to make sure the two-way access pricing need to be regulated by the government,it constructs the model of income distribution in use of the profit and loss analysis to make sure the two-way access pricing need to be regulated by the government.The results show that two-way access pricing increases the value of the whole network,and a larger increase happens in small networks,a smaller increase happens in large networks.If we do not use two-way access pricing,the small networks loses more than large networks based on the same profit.In theory,the leading power companies have reason to request unequal settlement.