国有连锁企业买方势力的福利分析

The Welfare Effect of State-owned Enterprises' Buying Power

一个拥有买方势力的连锁企业在多个相互分割的零售市场,分别与一个没有买方势力的地方企业进行Stackelberg竞争,其中连锁企业是一个部分追求利润、部分追求社会福利的国有企业,地方企业是一个完全追逐利润的私营企业。研究表明:无论连锁企业是否先行进入市场,买方势力的存在都损害了地方企业与上游厂商的利益,提高了连锁企业的利润,并惠及消费者乃至整个社会。

This paper develops a model where an upstream supplier sells its products through retailers in m>1 markets.In each downstream market,a national firm competes with a local firm in Stackelberg fashion.The national firm is a partially state-owned enterprise(SOE) which maximizes the weighted sum of both profits and social welfare.The local firms are private firms,which only cares about their own profits.It is shown that,an increase in buying power of the national firm reduces the profits of the upstream supplier and the local firms when the national retailer is a market leader.When the national retailer is a market follower,the profits of the upstream supplier and the local firms depend on the buying power and the state share of the national firm.Moreover,an increase in buying power enhances consumer surplus and social welfare.