高管薪酬信息披露能提高薪酬契约的有效性吗?

Can Information Disclosure of Executive Compensation Enhance the Effectiveness of Compensation Contract?

本文通过检验2005年前后高管薪酬—业绩之间敏感性的变化,考察了2005年我国上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的增强是否能够提高薪酬契约的有效性。检验结果表明,对于垄断行业的国有企业,其高管薪酬—业绩之间的敏感性在2005年前后没有发生变化;对于竞争行业的国有企业,其高管薪酬—业绩之间的敏感性在2005年之后有所下降,尤其是处于地区市场化进程比较低的国有企业;而对于竞争行业的民营企业,其高管薪酬—业绩之间的敏感性在2005年之后有所增强,尤其是处于地区市场化进程比较高的民营企业。以上研究结果表明,上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的增强,并不必然导致薪酬契约有效性的提高,对于不同类型的公司,其影响是不一样的,主要取决于上市公司所面临的人才竞争状况与公司治理水平。本文不仅丰富和拓展了国内外关于信息披露与高管薪酬之间关系的研究,而且对于我国监管部门增强高管薪酬信息披露的监管实践具有一定的指导意义。

The demand for greater corporate compensation disclosure has increased considerably in recent years, especially since the 2008 financial crisis. However, studies of executive compensation disclosure have yiel- ded many different results. On the one hand, improved compensation disclosure has been found to be associated with better governance, higher pay-for-performance sensitivity and improved monitoring by stakeholders （Perry and Zenner,2001 ; Bizjak et al. , 2011 ）. On the other hand, compensation disclosure regulations appear to have had very little mitigating effect on the problems involved in corporate compensation practices （Faulkender and Yang, 2013）. Improved disclosure might also have unintended consequences if it aggravates agency problems and affects related costs （Hermalin and Weisbach ,2012）. Compensation disclosure in emerging markets can be especially diffi- cult to analyze because of weak corporate governance, lax enforcement of security laws and a poor disclosure envi- ronment. Leuz and Wysocki （2008） point out that there have been major changes in disclosure regulations in many emerging markets. However, because institutional and economic factors vary in different markets the effects of these regulations may also vary. This paper examines whether information disclosure of executive compensation has enhanced the effectiveness of compensation contract in Chinese listed companies, by testing the change of executive pay--performance sensi- tivity before and after the 2005 regulation on executive compensation disclosure, since executive compensation dis- closure in China is fairly limited. The empirical results show that, for SOEs in regulated industry, there was no change of executive pay--performance sensitivity before and after 2005. The reasons may be that, on the one hand, because of the ＂internal labor market＂ in SOEs in regulated industry, compensation information at the individual level mat not provide much information for their managers. On the other hand, compensation of managers in SOEs in regulated industry is subject to more regulation, and high executive compensation in those firms is more likely to attract the attention of the public and investors. All of the above may lead to no change of executive pay--perform- ance sensitivity before and after the 2005 regulation on executive compensation disclosure. For SOEs in competitive industry, executive pay--performance sensitivity became weakened after 2005, especially for those firms in regions with low marketization level. The reasons may be that, after the 2005 regulation on executive compensation disclo- sure, it is easier for managers in SOEs in competitive industry to justify a higher pay raise by opportunistically using peer compensation information at the individual level, especially for those firms in regions with low marketization level where corporate governance is weaker. However, for Non-SOEs in competitive industry, executive pay--per- formance sensitivity became strengthened after 2005, especially for those firms in regions with high marketization level. The reasons may be that, after the 2005 regulation on executive compensation disclosure, it is more impor- tant for Non-SOEs in competitive industry to provide higher managerial pay to obtain better management talent, es- pecially for those firms in regions with high marketization level where the managerial market becomes more competi- tive. These results implicate that, information disclosure of executive compensation does not necessarily lead to the improvement of effectiveness of compensation contract. For different types of companies, its effect may be different, which depends on the corresponding competitiveness of managerial human capital and corporate governance. For ex- ample, for SOEs in regulated industry, it is necessary to introduce and improve the managerial market when enhan- cing information disclosure of executive compensation. For SOEs in competitive industry, it is necessary to improve corporate governance and mitigate the problem of insider control before enhancing information disclosure of execu- tive compensation. This paper not only enriches the studies on relation between information disclosure and executive compensation, but also provides guidance on the practice of improvement of executive compensation information dis- closure by regulators.