地方政府换届、税收征管与税收激进

Political Turnover,Tax Enforcement and Tax Aggressiveness

本文基于2005—2013年A股上市公司以及与此匹配的市委书记更替数据进行实证检验,研究结果显示,地方政府换届会提高税务机关的税收征管力度,企业税收激进程度将会降低,造成这一现象的主要原因有两个:一是政治关联失效与政治晋升激励驱动下新任官员加强税收征管力度,二是企业面对地方政府换届引发的政策、市场和政治风险不确定性时采取谨慎的避税行为。

As goes politics, so goes economic policy and performance. This is the case because, as goes eco- nomic performance, so goes the election. This relationship has been studied extensively by the theoretical and em- pirical literature on political business cycles and political budget cycles. The center idea of a political business cy- cle is that politicians have an incentive to implement demand-increasing policy measures prior to elections in order to boost economy. However, foreign theories about political business cycles are not suitable for China. There are two main reasons. First, Chinese government structure has possess the characteristics of M type. The power compo- sition of governments at all levels are almost the same. The authorities take control of land grant, bank credit, natu- ral resources and infrastructure invest. So local government has the power to interfere the economic activities. Sec- ond, officials in lower echelon are appointed by superior government. Officials＇ actions are reasonable reactions of promotion model. So the economic effects of Chinese local government transition and its corresponding theoretical bias are different from studies abroad. This makes the economic effect and corresponding theoretical basis, trans- mission mechanism of local government transition different from the studies abroad. This paper studies the effect of local political turnover on corporate tax aggressiveness in order to provide new ev- idence about the political dynamics of corporate microcosmic behavior. The problem of tax avoidance is serious in China. The surveys of counter-tax-evasion to tax contribution is only 460 million yuan in 2005 which rise to 52. 3 bil- lion yuan in 2013. This phenomenon has prompted a large number of literatures from the perspective of company gov- ernance, shareholders, public pressure, external audition and management agency problems to study the inner mech- anism of corporate tax radical changes. However, this lacks empirical researches of government＇ s influence on tax ag- gressiveness. By virtue of its tax claim on a firm＇ s cash flows, the state can be characterized as a de-facto sharehold- er in almost all corporations. So taxes cannot be minimized without considering the interests of firm stakeholders and contracting parties. Empirical inquiries have given limited attention to the position of the taxing government. We ex- tend the research related to tax aggressiveness determinants to government incentives in the Chinese context. Based on A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2013, we match them with the replacement data of the munic- ipal party committee secretaries. We find that political turnover enhances tax enforcement and decrease tax aggres- siveness due to two main reasons. Firstly, new leaders will increase tax enforcement because of promotion incen- tives and enterprise＇ political connection failure. Tax administration and enforcement in China can be subjective and selective. So the government leaders can control tax revenues to some degree. Secondly, enterprise will take cautious steps of tax avoidance while facing policy, market and political risk uncertainty. We also find that corpora- tions will get the government＇ s economic returns if they decrease tax avoidance after new leaders take office. The results not only enrich the empirical researches of political turnover＇ s effect on corporate microcosmic behavior, but also extend the studies of the macro political factors influencing tax aggressiveness and its internal mechanism. Base on the above findings, some conclusions are made. First of all, Local government has the power and in- centives to manipulate tax revenue. During the financial strain period, authority may impose excess tax. And it may ignore corporate tax avoidance because of enterprise political association. In order to reduce the distortion of the government intervention on tax collection, the key is to improve the system of tax administration and urge govern- ment exercise tax collection legally. Second, as political turnover affects tax aggressiveness, the relationship be- tween government and enterprises is the key to understand Chinese economy and corporation activities. Owners and managers need to measure the regional governance capability and the influence of the political risk while considering investment, tax, earnings management, etc.