对当前主审法官责任制改革的理性审视

Rational Insight into Reform of the Presiding Judges' Accountability System

主审法官责任制的实质是去除司法行政化,还权于审判者,解决审判者权力亏空问题。主审法官责任制改革早在1990年代就开始试行,与审判长负责制没有实质区别。分析主审法官责任制实践路径可知,其在公正与效率之间徘徊,被赋予了诸多的功能。理性审视某些地方主审法官责任制改革措施,其存在强烈的行政化倾向,审判权架构是"等级制"模式,将主审法官职位固定化,并定位为"法官之上的法官",与法官员额制发生冲突,只是确保了少数法官独立行使审判权,采取先放权后集权的方式来去除司法行政化可能导致改革偏差,存在诸多弊端,可能会跌入"钱穆制度陷阱"。应将主审法官责任制理解为办案法官责任制,构建"扁平化"审判权配置模式,加强法官独任审判制,完善合议庭制度,方能达到司法改革的目的。

The essence of presiding judge accountability system is to empower judges and thus solve the problem of the absence of judicial power.However,the presiding judge accountability system came into effect in 1990 sand had no essential difference from the chief judge accountability system.The enforcement path of presiding judge accountability system actually stranded in a status of intellectuality wandering,swinging between equality and efficiency and therefore was attached with too many functions.The designation of current justice system is of strong characteristic of administration,and the structure of judicial power is hierarchical,which leave the presiding judge above other judges.In this case,the enforcement of independent judicial power can be guaranteed only for top few judges.However,it is misleading to get rid of the influence of administration on the judicial system by retaking the judicial power after devolving it in the first place,which may cause the judicial system more likely to fall into the＂Qian Mu System Trap＂.All in all,the systematic structure of allocating judicial power should be flattened,sole judge system be strengthened,and the collegiate court system be optimized.