摘要
在企业研发外包的过程中,各相关方会面临研发路径的跨期不确定性。此时,作为企业研发外包的重要成本特征,合同的不完全性受到很大程度的制约,进而影响研发外包中委托方所要求的研发路径的实现。而在新的研发路径出现之后,由于企业研发外包的另一个重要成本特征——知识的非独占性,研发外包中的代理方很可能将之披露给委托方的竞争对手。显然,无论是合同的不完全性还是知识的非独占性,都会使得委托方利益受损。为了缓解利益受损的情况,委托方需要寻求双重治理机制,即:控制权配置机制和支付机制。在这种逻辑思路下,文章对企业研发外包中的双重治理机制问题进行了文献综述与理论展望。
In the process of R&D outsourcing in enterprises,the relevant parties are faced the inter-temporal uncertainty of R&D path,which determines contractual incompleteness with a great extent. The contractual incompleteness is one of the important features of R&D outsourcing. Therefore,the R&D path may not achieve in the process of outsourcing based on the principals’ requirements. The non-appropriable knowledge is another important feature for R&D outsourcing. After the appearance of a new R&D path,because of the non-appropriable knowledge,the agents,who undertake the R&D outsourcing,may reveal the related contents to the competitors of the principals. Obviously,whether contractual incompleteness or non-appropriable knowledge will make the principals face losses. In order to mitigate the severity of damaging profits,the principals need seek the dual governance mechanisms,including the allocated mechanism of control rights and the mechanism of payments. Following the previous logic,the literature review and theoretic outlook are made for the dual governance mechanisms of R&D outsourcing.
出处
《技术经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期52-57,共6页
Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71502099)
关键词
研发外包
权力配置
支付机制
知识外溢
道德风险
Outsourcing of R&D
Rights allocation
Payment mechanism
Knowledge spillover
Moral risk