上市公司管理者过度自信对融资次序的影响研究

Study of Influences of Managers' Overconfidence in Public Companies on Financing Order

以我国上市公司为研究对象,讨论过度自信的心理偏差是否会对上市公司的融资次序产生作用,以及对不同性质的上市公司融资次序选择的影响程度。首先选用并购频数法作为衡量标准,得出管理者过度自信的衡量指标,将样本区分为管理者过度自信和适度自信样本组;然后,区分六种具体的融资方式,建立多元选择排序OrderedProbit模型,从行为金融学的角度进行分析。研究发现:首先,过度自信的管理者会优先选择增发股票进行融资,而适度自信的管理者会优先选择短期借款融资;其次,非国有控股上市公司的过度自信管理者会更加倾向于增发股票进行筹资;最后,我国上市公司的融资次序不遵循优序融资理论,不论管理者是否过度自信,都会倾向于优先选择外部融资。

Chinese public companies are used as the research object. The aim is to revolve how overconfidence psychological bias will affect the financing order of public companies, as well as to how the behavior of managers＇ overconfidence Will affect financing order of the public companies with different nature. Firstly, merge and acquisition frequency method is used to compute the standard of managers＇ overconfidence, as well as the sample is divided into overconfidence managers and moderately confident manager. From the perspective of behavioral finance, six specific financing way to raise money are distinguished by setting up multiple selection model（ Ordered-Probit model）. It is concluded that issuing stock are preferred if the managers＇ of the public companies are overconfidence while Short-term debt financing is chosen by moderately confident manager. Additionally, issuing additional shares to raise money is their first choice if the managers are overconfidence in Non-state-owned holding public companies. What＇s more, Pecking Order Theory is not followed by stare - owned holding companies, regardless of whether managers are overconfidence, external finaneing is tend to be selected.