高管薪酬公平性、薪酬增长与代理成本——来自我国上市公司的证据

Management Compensation Fairness,Management Compensation Increase and Agent Cost——Evidence from Chinese Public Companies

本文在高管薪酬契约基础上,运用2005-2012年我国上市公司数据,从薪酬公平性的角度,分析并检验高管薪酬公平性对其薪酬增长及代理成本的影响。研究结果发现,当高管通过薪酬的社会比较,较低薪酬的高管与下一年度高管薪酬增长、资产周转率显著相关,高管薪酬公平性是造成我国上市公司高管薪酬不断增长的原因之一,并倾向性地增加了公司的代理成本,影响了激励效应。本文丰富和拓展了高管薪酬公平性激励效应的研究成果,为完善我国公司薪酬制度提供理论依据和指导。

This paper studies the effect of management compensation fairness on the compensation increase and the agent cost through an empirical analysis of the management compensation contract data of Chinese public companies from 2005 to2012. The findings show that peer comparison is highly related to the compensation increase and asset turnover ratio in the next year. Management compensation fairness is one of the causes that drive up the overall compensation,increase the agent cost,and affect the incentive effect. The paper provides a new perspective for research on management compensation increase and its effectiveness as an incentive.