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中国政府经济治理的项目体制研究 被引量:40

The Model of Chinese Economic Governance: Project Institutions
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摘要 本文研究了近年来中国政府经济治理主要模式——"项目体制"的基本内涵、理论与运作机制,并试图论证项目体制与经济发展及其各种经济问题的内在关联。分税制改革后,中央政府在经济治理上依靠专项项目形式自上而下来动员下级政府和市场企业,并促成了地方政府经济治理的项目化,最终演化为政府经济治理的项目体制。这种体制引发了部委、地方政府和企业之间的项目竞争运动,激发了地方政府"跑项目"、"大办项目"和"拉项目"的热情,从而推动了项目经济大繁荣。虽然项目体制是进入21世纪中国经济高速发展的重要解释之一,但它仍然是一种"半计划、半市场"的经济体制,也是以政府项目垄断权为主导的粗放经济发展模式,它从市场决定领域退出势在必行。 Although China's institutions look ill-suited for the western countries, Chinese economic development has made great achievements in the world. At present, there are a few explanations for the Chinese puzzle. However, these literatures do not have good solution to this puzzle. This paper provides the hypothesis of project institutions to explain 'the Chinese Puzzle'. Project institutions have gradually substituted the double-track system since the tax sharing reform ,which makes china transfer from an imperfect market economy to the relatively perfect market economy. The institutions not only reduce top-down bureaucratic organization costs, but also lead to the competition among local governments and enterprises. The project institutions create the miracle of China's economic growth. Nevertheless, it also brings a lot of serious problems. Therefore,how to withdraw from the fields of market is the important policy for further deepen economic reform.
作者 郑世林
出处 《中国软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第2期23-38,共16页 China Soft Science
基金 中国社会科学院哲学社会科学创新工程项目(阶段性)成果 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71573272) 教育部人文社科一般项目(13YJC790219) 中国博士后基金面上项目(2013M530001)资助
关键词 项目制 经济发展 政府 市场 project institutions the China Puzzle competition economic growth
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