煤炭企业低碳化转型的演化路径分析

Analysis of Path Evolution of Low-carbon Transition Development of Coal Enterprises

针对煤炭企业低碳化转型路径的动态演变性,从政企博弈的视角出发,运用演化博弈的理论,在有限理性的条件下,构建低碳经济下政府与煤炭企业的演化博弈模型。研究表明:政府和煤炭企业的低碳策略选择主要依赖于各自演化的初始状态及演化路径,只有基于长远利益进行决策,才能获得更高的收益;政府的碳排放奖惩力度和监管成本,煤炭企业低碳转型成本和低碳收益都会对演化博弈结果产生影响。

Low-carbon transition development of coal enterprises has characters of dynamic evolution.With the perspective of the game between government and enterprises, applies the of evolutionary game to establish the evolutionary game model of low-carbon economy between government and coal enterprises based on the limited rationality of game participants. The study shows us that the choices about low-carbon strategy of the government and the coal enterprise mainly depends on the initial state and the evolution path of the evolution. When based on the long-term interests of decision-making, it get a higher yield; it has some influences for the results of evolutionary game with the government′ s carbon emissions incentives and regulatory costs, Coal enterprise′ s low-carbon transition cost and profits.