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农地流转的契约期限选择——威廉姆森分析范式及其实证 被引量:41

Farmland Transfer,Transaction Cost and the Choice of Contract Period: Williamson's Paradigm and Empirical Analysis
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摘要 尽管长期契约往往被认为更有效率,但在农地流转的租赁缔约活动中短期契约却是普遍现象。本文基于威廉姆森交易费用分析范式,对农地租约期限的决定机理及其影响因素进行分析。研究表明,农户的农地流转呈现明显的缔约对象差序化与契约期限短期化特征;农户对土地的专用性投资、对承租者信息的充分了解程度及其选择空间以及对租约谈判能力的不足是其选择短期契约的关键因素;农户土地租约期限的长短与缔约对象的亲疏关系具有典型的二元选择特征。本文进一步讨论了"空契约"及无期限契约问题。 Despite the long- term contract is often seen as more efficient,lease- contracting activities in farmland circulation,short- term contracts is a common phenomenon. This article is based on transaction cost analysis paradigm of Williamson,the land lease contract period decision mechanism and influence factors were analyzed. Research shows that:( 1) the farmer's land circulation has obvious characteristics of the pattern of difference sequence the contract objects and the short- terming of contracts;( 2) the key factors of its short- term obligation are the farmers' specific investment on the land,the adequacy of tenant information and options,as well as the insufficient of the lease negotiations ability;( 3) relationship between the length of the farmers 'land lease period and the contract objects' affinities,has the characteristics of a typical binary choice. The article further discusses the issues of empty contract and no term contract.
出处 《农业经济问题》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第2期25-32,110,共8页 Issues in Agricultural Economy
基金 国家自然科学基金重点项目"农村土地与相关要素市场培育与改革研究"(编号:71333004) 教育部创新团队发展计划"中国农村基本经营制度"(编号:IRT-14R17) 国家社科基金项目"产权垄断 禀赋效应与农地流转抑制"(编号:13CJL048)的阶段性成果
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