基于合作博弈的碳配额交易价格形成机制研究

Carbon Cap-and-trade Pricing Mechanism Based on Cooperative Game Theory

现阶段我国碳交易试点已启动,形成碳配额交易价格机制的任务迫在眉睫。本文在考虑尤为复杂的碳市场风险体系的基础上,针对我国碳市场众多、有场无市、市场不成熟等特有现象提出了基于合作博弈理论的碳配额价格机制。本文首先运用网络层次分析法(ANP)来确定碳配额交易的风险值,综合考虑了影响碳市场的所有风险因子。然后应用班茨哈夫-克莱曼(B-C)权利指数来探讨交易伙伴的选择与交易量的瓜分,分散了交易风险。最后通过Shapley值和核仁法来探讨碳配额交易利益分配的合理性,保障了合作联盟的稳定性。此时,碳配额价格便可由利润公式求出。本文的研究结果表明,应用该三阶段博弈模型来模拟碳配额交易的价格形成机制可以有效地分散交易风险,能够很好地解决碳交易市场风险较一般市场大且复杂这一问题,是实现我国统一碳市场的重大推力。

Carbon trading pilot was launched in China recently, and the next urgent task is to form a carbon cap-and-trade pricing mechanism. Given that the carbon market in China is highly fragmented, immature and lacking of transactions, this paper proposes a carbon cap-and-trade pricing mechanism based on cooperative game theory and takes account of particularly complex risk system of carbon mar- ket. This paper firstly determines the risk value of cap-and-trade by Analytic Network Process, which considers all risk factors of the car- bon market synthetically. Then, to disperse the trading risk, B-C index is applied to discuss the choice of trading partners and the trading volume. Finally, this paper discusses the rationality of the carbon trading profit distribution by Shapley value and Nucleolus method, which guarantees the stability of the alliance. Here, carbon cap-and-trade price can be calculated by profit formula. The study shows that applying this three-stage game model to simulate the carbon cap-and-trade pricing mechanism can disperse trading risk effectively and solve the problem that the risk of carbon trading market is larger and more complex than common market. Hence, it is the key driver for implementing unified carbon market in China.