理性、生活与此在:海德格尔早期生命现象学的转向

Reason,life and Dasein: The turn to the phenomenology of life in early Heidegger

文章对海德格尔"现象学时代"之思想嬗变的讨论,旨在提供一种阐释海德格尔早期生命哲学转向的可能思路。胡塞尔的现象学方法为海德格尔提供了表述源初生活体验的可能性;与此同时,拒斥笛卡尔式主体性的努力,一直贯穿在海德格尔早年对关于此在的基础存在论的建构过程之中。换言之,通过拥抱胡塞尔现象学来拒斥新康德主义的主观逻辑,与通过转向生命现象学来拒斥内在于胡塞尔现象学之中的笛卡尔式主体性问题,这两种思想冲动同时交织在海德格尔的"现象学时代"探索"源初生活体验"的哲学路向上,构成了《存在与时间》这部"20世纪最伟大的反笛卡尔主义著作"形成的"史前史"。

This paper focuses on the development of Heideggerian phenomenology. In his early phenomenological decade,while probing the possibilities for interpreting life experience from Husserlian phenomenology,Heidegger on the other hand refuses its Cartesian presuppositions of subjectivity.There are two fundamental impulses in early Heidegger's explication of the original life experience: while embracing Husserlian phenomenology in order to refuse Neo- Kantian subjective logic on the one hand,Heidegger resorts to a kind of life phenomenology on the other hand in order to refuse some elements in the Cartesian subjectivity which he finds in Husserlian phenomenology. This paper intends to sketch out a brief'pre- history'of how this'one of the 20 th century's greatest anti- Cartesian works',namely,Being and Time,is conceived.