《逻辑研究》与《大观念》中的意向性结构与本质直观

The structure of intentionality and essential intuition in Logical Investigation and Ideas Ⅰ

胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》中将意向性刻画为意识的本质特征,并对意向性结构进行了详细分析。最为重要的是,他对意向本质与认识本质进行了区分,从而为我们理解现象学的"存在论"与"认识论"的关系提供了关键线索。胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》中的"本质直观"的方法及其理论困难,体现在对意向本质与认识本质的分析以及意向对象的分析中。而这样的困难使得胡塞尔在《大观念》(《纯粹现象学通论》的简称)中重新对意向性进行了探讨,提出了意向行为(Noesis)-意向对象(Noema)结构,其中将意义与存在问题相关联,深化了现象学的关键主题,从而为我们理解胡塞尔的存在论与认识论(存在与意义)的关系提供了新的视角。

In Logical Investigation Husserl describes intentionality as the essential trait of our consciousness,and gives a detailed analysis of the structure of intentionality. Most significantly,he distinguishes intentional essence from cognitive essence,which provides a key to the understanding of the relationship between the phenomenological'ontology'and 'theory of knowledge'. This paper analyzes Husserl's'eidetic intuition'and the theoretical difficulties incurred by it in Logical Investigation. These difficulties motivate Husserl to discuss the Noesis- Noema structure,whose central issue is the Seinsinn \the sense of being,therefore giving us the new possibility of reinterpreting the phenomenological'ontology'and'theory of knowledge'.