碳关税下政府补贴政策及企业减排研发决策的研究

Research on the Optimal Emission-Abatement R&D Subsidy Policy under Carbon Tariff

以碳关税政策下发展中国家选择减排研发补贴政策为背景,构建了一个三阶段动态博弈模型。第一阶段为发达国家和发展中国家各自设定碳关税率及研发补贴率;第二阶段为发展中国家企业根据补贴率及税率确定减排率;第三阶段为发达国家及发展中国家企业在发达国家市场上进行产量竞争。利用逆向递归方法求解该动态博弈的最优决策,并对其进行深入分析,分析结果显示:碳关税在一定条件下可以促进企业碳减排并改善环境,但关税会对两国之间的贸易造成一定负面影响。关税政策和补贴政策能够有效提高各自企业的竞争力,但过多的政府干预会影响市场正常秩序。对于发展中国家来说,补贴政策能够促进企业的减排行为,并且企业的成本优势越明显,减排效果越好。

Based on the background that developing countries choose emission abatement R＆D subsidy policy to cope with the carbon tariff policy established by developed countries, this paper builds a three stage dynamic game between one developed country and one developing country. In the first stage, developed countries decide the carbon tariff rate and developing countries decide the subsidy rate; in the second stage, firms in developing countries make the emission abatement decision according to carbon tariff rate and subsidy rate; in the third stage, two firms from a developed country and a developing country respectively compete in the market of developed country. By using backward induction, the optimal decisions of countries and firms are derived. Theoretical analysis and numerical analysis show that carbon tariff can promote emission-abatement behaviors of firms in certain conditions, but it will hurt the trade between two countries. Carbon tariff policy of developed countries and subsidy policy of developing countries can effectively improve the competitiveness of their own firms, but the excessive government intervention will affect normal market order. Specifically, for developing countries, the subsidy policy can promote its firms＇ emission-abatement behavior. Moreover, the promotion effectiveness is increasing in the cost advantage of the firms.