地方政府公共服务外包行为设置研究

The study of the local government outsourcing behavior setting in public service

从规制异化与晋升激励的视角来看待地方政府在公共服务外包设置上的问题,以"规制—晋升激励异化"对官员外包行为的影响建立分析框架,以此剖析规制异化与晋升激励对地方政府外包行为设置的机理。研究表明,政府官员在规制—晋升激励二元扭曲时,在公共服务外包设置中更容易偏向工程类,即当决策规制权越大,晋升激励越强时,会有更多官员有意进行工程外包设置。总之,规制—晋升激励二元异化为地方官员外包设置诱发机会主义行为提供了必要条件,使公共服务外包项目重心偏向于工程类服务,进而损害公共利益。

This article answers the issue of behavior setting of local government in the public service outsourcing, from the perspective of regulation and promotion incentive alienation. Through ＂regulation - promotion incentive alienation＂ ,which the influence of officials outsourcing behavior,we built an analytical framework, we analyse regulation dissimilation and promotion incentive alienation,in order to explain behavior mechanism of outsourcing setting behavior of local government.When binary distortion in regulation - promotion incentives, government officials in public service outsourcing is partial to engineering, namely, the greater the right of decision- making rules and regulations and the promotion incentives, the more there will be more officials intent on outsourcing project Settings. Anyhow, amid outsourcing services, regulation - promotion incentive dual dissimilation for local officials tends to induce opportunistic behavior, and provides the necessary conditions ,and impair public interests.