降低顾客退货的店铺辅助服务战略的均衡分析

Equilibrium analysis of store assistance strategy for reducing consumer returns

顾客退货,尤其是无理由退货已经成为困扰零售业企业运作的关键问题.本文考虑企业可以选择投资店铺辅助服务来降低顾客退货率,在Hotelling模型的框架下建立了竞争性企业店铺辅助服务的战略选择的博弈模型,给出了四种战略组合下企业服务水平与定价决策的子博弈精炼纳什均衡及其唯一存在的条件,讨论了企业店铺辅助服务战略选择博弈的纳什均衡.研究发现,产品的差异性及非对称的顾客退货率将会对四种战略组合下的企业决策及绩效产生显著影响,而顾客退货率的差异程度则是影响企业是否选择店铺辅助服务战略的关键要素.

Consumer returns have become a serious problem of retailers’ operation management,especially the no-reason return.This paper considers that an enterprise could reduce the return rate through investing in store-assistance service（SAS）.With the Hotelling’s framework,we establish the noncooperative game model to describe firms’ SAS level and pricing decision.Furthermore,we propose the conditions that guarantee the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game is uniquely existed.The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the SAS choice game is also investigated.We find that the degree of product differentiation and the asymmetric return rate play an important role in firms’ equilibrium outcomes,as well as the equilibrium payoffs.Furthermore,the latter also has the dramatic impact on firms’ SAS choice.