环境规制与企业绩效——基于代理成本的视角

Environmental Regulation and Corporate Performance——Based on the Perspective of Agency Costs

在微观企业层面上,"波特假说"及其理论支持者以往较多地从生产成本、创新研发的角度来探讨环境规制对企业绩效和竞争力的影响,而鲜有从公司治理的角度来研究两者之间的内在关系。以代理成本为视角1,借鉴现代产业经济学的"结构—行为—绩效"分析范式,引入代理成本作为中介变量,研究环境规制对企业绩效提升的机理。研究结果发现:环境规制对提高企业绩效、抑制代理成本具有显著的推动作用;代理成本在环境规制与企业绩效的关系中起到部分中介作用。

On the micro -enterprise level, the Porter hypothesis and its following supporters have explored the the effects of environmental regulation on cooperate performance and competitiveness mainly from the angle of the production cost, innovation, research and development, but rarely study the internal relations between the environ- mental regulation and cooperate performance from the perspective of corporate governance. In this paper, the paradigm＂ structure-behavior-performance＂ in the modern industrial economics is used, and the agent cost is introduced as a intermediary variable to study the mechanism how environmental regulation promote the cooperate performance The resuhs show that the environmental regulation statistically promote the performance and reduce the agent cost insignificantly, and the agent cost plays a intermediary role between the environmental regulation and cooperate performance.