产品市场竞争、公司治理与分析师盈利预测质量

Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance and Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Quality

以中国2004-2013年A股上市公司为样本,检验了产品市场环境、公司治理水平以及证券分析师预测质量的关联。结果表明,公司治理对分析师预测有显著影响,但不同的机制造成的影响不同,其中董事会规模、大股东持股比例和管理层薪酬激励能够提高上市公司信息披露质量,降低分析师预测误差。产品市场竞争通过与公司治理机制的配合产生作用:产品市场竞争与大股东治理和高管薪酬激励之间存在互补效应,与董事会治理、股权制衡存在替代效应。

Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2013 in China, we use OLS regression and investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanism, product market competition and financial analysts＇ earnings forecast accuracy. This pa- per finds that reasonable arrangements for the structure of corporate governance can promote financial analysts＇ earnings forecast quality by reducing their forecast error. At the same time, market competition acts as a critical role of both mutual complement and substitute in terms of different corporate governance indicator.