上市公司未决诉讼对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响

The Effect of Pending Litigation on Pay-Performance Sensitivity

选取2008—2014年沪深两市主板A股上市公司作为样本,首先比较了未决诉讼与已决诉讼的风险差异对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的不同影响,验证了诉讼事项的风险主要来自于未决诉讼;然后从未决诉讼的涉诉频率、涉诉总额两个维度,对上市公司未决诉讼对其高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响进行了分析,发现未决诉讼的涉诉频率越高、涉诉总额越大,高管薪酬业绩敏感性越低;最后区分公司的产权性质,发现较之国有上市公司,民营上市公司在面临未决诉讼时高管薪酬业绩敏感性下降更为显著。

Based on the Chinese A-share main board listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the year of 2008-2014, this paper not only portrays the situation of pending litigation of Chinese listed companies from such dimensions as the frequency of pending litigation, and the amount of money of the pending litigation during this period, but also examines the impact of pending litigation on pay-performance sensitivity. The findings of our study are as follows. First, relative to the progress of litigation, the pending litigation can experience more significant reduction in the pay-performance sensitivity than the settled ones. Second, the frequency of pending litigation and the amount of money of the pending litigation can lower the pay-performance sensitivity. Third, the reduction of the pay-performance sensitivity is more pronounced in the nonstate-owned listed companies than in the state-owned listed companies.