审计质量、终极控制人与投资效率

Audit Quality,Ultimate Controller and Investment Efficiency

基于中国沪深A股上市公司的实际数据,借鉴Richardson的研究模型,分析并实证检验了审计监督质量的改善是否有利于提高上市公司的资本配置效率。研究结果发现,审计质量的改善能够提高我国上市公司的资本配置效率。进一步研究发现,不仅不同产权特征的上市公司资本配置效率损失的类型存在显著差异,而且审计监督质量的改善对公司资本配置效率的提升作用也与公司的产权特征密切相关。按照地方政府控制、中央政府控制、国有企业集团控制和民营上市公司的排序,高质量审计监督对非效率投资行为的抑制作用逐渐加强。

Based on the data disclosed by the Chinese listed corporations in Shanghai and Shenzhen A stock market,this paper conducted an empirical research on whether the improvement of auditing monitoring can enhance the capital allocation efficiency of listed corporations.The results showed that:(1)It is really helpful to relieve the poor capital allocation efficiency of our listed corporations with the improvement of auditing monitoring quality.(2)The lost of capital allocation efficiency showed significant differences between the corporations which have different property rights characteristics,and the governance effect by auditing monitoring on the elevation of capital allocation efficiency is closely associated with property rights characteristics.The inhibiting effect of high quality auditing monitoring to inefficient investment behaviors increase gradually according to the sequence of listed corporations under the control of local government,listed corporations under the control of central government,the SOE affiliations,and the private affiliations.