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基于Shapley分配的排污权交易联盟博弈 被引量:5

Emission Trading Coalition Game Based on Shapley Distribution
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摘要 围绕解决排污权交易在污水治理产业化中的应用问题,依据具有可支付的联盟博弈的基本理论,以排污权交易联盟的支付函数为特征函数,构造了排污权交易联盟博弈模型。研究表明:(1)排污权交易联盟博弈为凸博弈;(2)在多数情况下,Shapley值为该联盟博弈的一个分配,且为核心分配,从而证明了该联盟博弈的分配具有稳定性;(3)建立排污权交易联盟博弈可有效推动污水的分散治理向专业化、产业化、集中治理转变。研究成果解决了排污企业在排污权交易联盟博弈中的收益分配问题,为排污权交易制度在污水治理产业化中的应用找到了一条重要途径。 The main purpose of this study was to solve application problems of emission trading in sewage treatment industry.Based on the basic theory of coalition game can be paid with,the payment function of emission trading alliance as the characteristic function,constructs the game model of pollution discharge right trade union.Research shows that:(1)The emission trading league game is convex game;(2)In the majority of cases,the value of Shapley is a distribution for the Union's game,and as the core distribution,which proved that the distribution of the league game with stability;(3)The establishment of emissions trading alliance game can improve the dispersion of management to specialization,industrialization,centralized governance transformation of sewage.The research would solve the problem of sewage enterprises about the income distribution in the emission trading alliance game,find an important channel for the application of the emissions trading system in sewage treatment industry.
出处 《系统工程》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2016年第1期34-40,共7页 Systems Engineering
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272095G0203)
关键词 排污权交易 合作博弈 污水治理产业化 Emission Trading Cooperative Game Sewage Treatment Industry
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参考文献12

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