对康德的相容论内涵的再思考

Rethinking Kant's Compatibilism

康德断言,人的意志自由与其经验性活动的必然性是相容的。学界对康德的相容论作了两种截然不同的解释,争论双方分别站在本体主义和主观主义的立场,展开了旷日持久的争论,并不断有新的代表和观点出现,而主观主义的解释成为了更为流行的解释。本文首先对康德的理性、行为、品格、意向等相关性概念进行分析,说明它们的对象都有本体和现象两个层面,梳理了理知的品格与经验性的品格的微妙关系,继而介绍和讨论相关学界争论中的重要观点与论证,最终说明,本体主义的理解,而不是主观主义的理解,才真正契合康德的相容论。主观主义解释尤其难以说明,理知的品格和经验性的品格如何统一于同一个主体,而前者又构成了后者的根据。这种解释通过理性本体与理知的品格不能被用于解释行为,来说明理性与理知的品格并无规定行为的力量,这也是不充分的。

Kant asserts that the free will of human beings is compatible with the necessity of their empirical activities. Scholars in international academic sphere take two main standpoints – noumenalist and subjectivist standpoints – and debate chronically. New representatives and ideas of the two kind of interpretation appear continuously,and the subjectivist interpretation has become more popular. Firstly the author analyzes the relevant concepts of reason, action, character, conviction, clarifies the doubleness of their objects and the subtle relation between intelligible character and empirical character.Then he introduces and discusses the crucial views in relevant international debates,so as to show that the noumenalist understanding,rather than the subjectivist understanding,actually coincides with Kant'scompatibilism. It is especially difficult for subjectivist interpreter to explain,how intelligible character and empirical character are united in one and the same subject,and how the former functions as the ground of the latter. It is also insufficient for this interpretation to conclude that reason and intelligible character has not the power to determine human actions from that reason and intelligible character cannot be used in explaining actions.