龙树中观哲学中的自性

Svabhāva in Nāgārjuna's Context

本文抛开后世中观论师的理论阐释,基于龙树的《中论颂》等著作考察其所批判的自性的含义,进而明确无自性而空的意义。以认识论怀疑主义为前提,龙树指出一切概念都同时含示着固定不变的存在主体及其必须参与的变化和观待,从而导致自相矛盾而不能有所指向。其语境中的自性即是概念的预设指示对象。由此龙树主张众生的一切概念皆无所指对象,也就是一切唯是空名而无自性,这一意义的空即是所知世界的彻底不存在,与后世论师所主张的"缘起有自性空"有方向性的差别。

This paper, based on Nāgārjuna's works( especially the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā), aims to investigate the concept of own-being( svabhāva),thereby explicating the significance of 'devoid-of-ownbeing'( ni·hsvabhāva) and 'empty '( s' ūnya) in Nāgārjuna's context. Departing from a sceptical presupposition,Nāgārjuna points out that all concepts are self-contradictory and devoid of referents by showing that the assumed referents,which are supposed to have a static identity,are necessarily subject to change or dependence. Therefore,the svabhāva refuted by Nāgārjuna refers to the assumed referent of a concept. After demonstrating the inevitable failure of any concept to have a valid referent,Nāgārjuna concludes that all things we know are merely empty names without svabhāva,namely,nothing within our ken can possibly exist.