考虑外科医生绩效的择期手术占台问题研究

Research on Mendacious Elective Surgical Case Information Considering the Surgeons' Performance

考虑到择期手术排程过程中,不同的主刀医生可能会告诉手术排程中心虚假的手术需求信息。在收益函数中引入惩罚成本,分析了主刀医生虚报手术台数对收益函数的影响。数值算例结果表明,适当的惩罚成本能有效解决择期手术排程过程中虚报手术台数问题,以到达在主手术日多排一些手术的目的。

We consider a problem in the process of elective surgery scheduling where different surgeons may tell mendacious informa- tion to the operating room scheduling center in order to operate more surgeries. We first establish a revenue function with penalty costs, and then analyze the interplay between different probability of new surgical arrivals and the mendacious surgical numbers af- fecting the revenue function. At last, we validate the effectiveness and correctness of the results through simulation. We find that penalty costs can effectively solve the problem of mendacious elective surgical case information. As long as penalty costs are reasona- ble, the surgeons will control the mendacious surgical numbers.