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家族涉入与企业技术创新 被引量:17

Family Involvement and Firm Technological Innovation
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摘要 本文通过构建三维交互模型,探求了家族涉入程度与企业技术创新投入之间的关系,并递进研究治理情境复杂性的二维交互作用与绩效困境的三维交互作用。研究发现:随着家族涉入程度的上升,家族企业技术创新强度降低;当治理主体复杂程度上升时,家族涉入对企业技术创新投入的负向影响加深;而随着企业经营困境的加深,治理主体复杂性所致的负向调节作用进一步加深。上述结论与行为代理理论的预期相悖,说明治理情境复杂度可能是行为代理理论的适用边界之一,该理论不宜用于解释治理情境复杂企业的风险承担问题。 This paper establishes a three-dimension interaction model to study the relationship between family involvement and firm technological innovation input, and further focus on the two-dimension interaction effect of governance context complexity and the three-dimension interaction effect of performance hazard. It comes to the following conclusions.firstly, the increase in family involvement leads to the reduction in technological innovation intensity in family firms; secondly, as the complexity of governance subjects increases, the negative effect of family involvement on firm technological innovation input deepens; thirdly, as firm business hazard deepens, the negative moderating role of the com- plexity of governance subjects further deepens.These conclusions above-mentioned go against the expectation of behavioral agency theory, showing that governance context complexity may serve as an applicable boundary of behavioral agency theory. In other words, behavioral agency theory is inappropriate to explain risk-taking behavior in family firms in complex governance context.
出处 《外国经济与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第3期86-98,112,共14页 Foreign Economics & Management
基金 国家自然科学基金青年项目(71302090)
关键词 行为代理理论 家族涉入 技术创新投入 治理情境复杂性 绩效困境 behavioral agency theory family involvement technological innovation input governance context complexity performance hazard
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