不完全信息动态博弈视角的农村土地征收治理路径优化

Governance Path Optimization of Rural Land Acquisition From Perspective of Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information

农村土地征收对城乡发展具有重要作用,当前治理路径需进一步优化。利用不完全信息动态博弈模型分析征地困境,并据此探讨优化征地活动的路径,为土地征收工作改进提供参考。研究认为:在征地博弈中,地方政府的类型及农民对该类型的先验概率分布对博弈结果会产生重要影响,这也是引起征地实际偏离社会最优征地选择的重要原因。为优化现实中的征地活动,可通过调整征地博弈的收益矩阵、降低农民维权成本等措施来增加对征地活动的约束;同时,对地方政府类型及农民对此的信念进行调整也必不可少。

Rural land acquisition has profound effects on urban and rural development while its governance path still needs further optimization.The purpose of this study is to analyze land acquisition with a more realistic model：dynamic game with incomplete information model and try to seek for approaches to optimize land acquisition.The results indicate that types of local governments and farmers＇ prior belief distribution in them exert a great effect on the eventual result,which is also an important reason for the results deviating from the optimal choice of society in reality.Then,we conclude that to optimize land acquisition we can put more constraints on them through the way of adjusting the game pay-off matrix and decreasing the cost of maintaining and protecting their own legitimate interests for the farmers.What is more,adjusting the types of local governments and the beliefs of farmers also can＇t be ignored.