摘要
联合生产领域的背叛通常是合作基础上的背叛,现有的合作博弈模型与非合作博弈模型均不易进行较好地刻画。为此,构建了一个非完全合作的两人博弈模型,用于刻画联合生产时既要偷工减料又不能使联合关系破裂的经济现象。文中给出了基于收益和回报率两个版本的博弈模型,分析了参数对模型特征的影响。基于回报率模型,研究了BA无标度网络上的演化博弈,分析了合作密度对模型参数的依赖关系。揭示了电子联合生产领域偷工减料以次充好的现实问题。
Existing cooperative and non-cooperative games cannot satisfactorily describe the defections in joint production because such defections are generally underlain by cooperation. A non-fully cooperative game with two players is constructed to describe the behavior of jerry-builders in joint production. Two distinct versions of the model are given,one based on payoff and the other on rate of profit. The influence of parameters on the model features is analyzed. Based on rate of profit,evolution game on BA scale-free networks is studied and the cooperation density dependence of model parameter analyzed,revealing shoddy social reality in the field of joint production of electronics.
出处
《电子科技》
2016年第3期1-4,共4页
Electronic Science and Technology
基金
沪江基金资助项目(C14002)
上海理工大学光电信息与计算机工程学院教师创新能力建设基金资助项目(GDCX-Y-1212)
上海市研究生创新基金资助项目(JWCXSL1402)
2014年上海市大学生创新创业训练计划基金资助项目(SH2014036)
