自然类、物种与动力学系统

Natural Kinds, Biological Species, and Dynamical System

关于生物物种的本体论地位存在两种主要观点:传统观点认为物种是拥有本质的自然类,另一种替代观点认为物种是没有本质的个体。传统观点的困难是本质主义与进化论不相容,但这并不能成为物种个体论的理由。混杂实在论和自我平衡属性簇理论主张自然类的一种非本质主义解释,物种仍然可以看做典型的自然类,但是这种进路同样面临不少困难。本文试图提出生物物种的一种动力学系统理论进路,也即把物种视作动力学系统状态空间中的吸引子,进而将这种进路扩展为自然类的一种新本质主义解释。

There are two main views about the ontological status of biological species. Traditional view thinks that species are natural kinds with essence, while an alternative view claims that species are individuals without essence. The difficulty of traditional view is that essentialism is incon-sistent with evolutionary theory, which is not the reason for species-as-individuals, however. Promiscuous Realism and HPC theory hold a non-essen-tialist account of natural kinds. According to them, species could still be considered as typical natural kinds, but this non-essentialist approach to species and natural kinds faces many difficulties too. This paper attempts to purpose a dynamical system theoretical account of biological species,which takes species as attractors in state space of a dynamical system. If it is successful, this approach can be extended to be a new essentialist ac-count of natural kinds.