合同与信任对投机行为和长期导向的影响:替代还是互补

The Impact of Contract and Trust on Opportunistic Behavior and Long-term Orientation: Substitutes or Complements

成功的渠道合作伙伴关系,关键在于维持合作企业间关系的持续性,并抑制投机行为带来的风险。合同和信任是保证交易顺利进行的两种渠道控制机制,目前二者关系是替代还是互补仍存在争论。在理论分析的基础上,结合中国营销渠道的特征,深入探讨了合同机制、组织间信任的关系,以及二者对渠道投机行为和长期导向的影响;研究过程中,引入中国的人情、面子、礼等关系规范,讨论中国式关系规范对上述关系的调节作用。结果表明:合同与信任并不是相互替代的关系;合同和信任两者都能够有效抑制投机行为,合同对长期导向作用并不显著,而信任则对长期导向有显著的正向影响;关系规范对"合同-投机行为"有减弱的调节效应,对"信任-投机行为"的调节作用则不显著;关系规范对"合同-长期导向"没有显著调节作用,对"信任-长期导向"则有正向的调节作用。

The key of successful channel partnership is to maintain continued relationship between the cooperative firms and curb speculative behavior risks. Contract and trust is deemed necessary control mechanisms of channels to ensure transactions going,but their alternative or complementary relationship is still in debate. Therefore,on the basis of theoretical analysis and considering characteristics of the Chinese marketing channels,the relationship between contract and inter- organizational trust is discussed in depth,as well as their impact on opportunistic behavior and long- term orientation. Then,the relation norms of China,such as renqing,mianzi,li,are introduced to test the moderating effects among above relationships. The research results showthat contract and trust relationship are not substitutes for each other; contract and trust both can effectively restrain opportunistic behavior. Trust has significantly positive effect on long- term orientation,while contract effect is not significant. Relation norms have weakened moderating effect on the＂contract- opportunism＂,while they have no significant moderating effect on ＂trust- opportunism＂; the moderating effect of relation norms on ＂contracts- LTO ＂is not significant,while their moderating effect on＂trust- LTO＂is positive and significant.