基于前景理论的上市公司阈值处盈余管理研究

A Study of Earnings Management(at threshold value)of Chinese Listed Companies Based on Prospect Theory

本文基于前景理论视角,利用中国沪深两市2012年至2013年A股上市公司的财务数据,对上市公司阈值处经理人盈余管理行为进行研究。发现上市公司阈值处存在明显的盈余管理现象,且阈值左右的盈余管理行为能通过前景理论得到很好的诠释,即阈值左侧表现为风险偏好,阈值右侧则表现为风险规避。本文的研究不仅能够解释上市公司阈值两侧盈余管理行为差异的原因,也为投资者和监管部门认清上市公司盈余管理行为的本质提供理论依据。

Based on Prospect Theory, this paper studies the earning management at threshold value using financial data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies between 2012 and 2013. We find significant earning management when the earnings of these listed companies are close to the threshold value. In addition, those earning management behavior can be explained by Prospect Theory. The explanation is as follows： The managers are risk-loving when earning above the threshold value and the managers are inclined to aggressive earning management. When earning below the threshold value, these managers convert to risk-averse and the motivation for aggressive earning management is also remarkably reduced. This paper can interpret the public companies＇ behavior variation of earnings management at threshold value and provide theoretical foundation for the investors and regulators to recognize the essence of these companies＇ earnings management behavior.