零售商竞争环境下数量折扣和进场费组合的渠道协调策略

Channel Coordination Strategy Mixed by Quantity Discount and Slotting Allowances under the Environment of Retailer Competition

为了解决渠道价格决策中的二次价格加成问题,研究者提供了众多渠道定价策略对渠道进行协调,其中,数量折扣定价策略得到了广泛运用,但该策略可能会导致渠道成员利润恶化。为了解决上述问题,本研究采用博弈论方法,提出了一种数量折扣定价和进场费组合的渠道定价策略,以同时实现渠道整体和渠道成员的优化,并采用示例方法对结果进行检查。论文以垂直一体化为协调目标、常规定价为参考基准,将数量折扣和进场费组合的渠道定价策略与两部定价策略进行比较分析,结果显示,数量折扣和进场费组合的定价策略使整体渠道达到理想的协调效果,同时,渠道成员的利润也得到了改善。

In order to solve the problem of double marginalization in channel pricing, researchers have proposed different pricing strategies to coordinate the marketing channel. Quantity discount is used widely, but this pricing strategy may hurt some channel partners. Therefore, it can＇t ensure that the goal of channel coordination is achieved definitely. Slotting allowance is given to a retailer by a manufacturer as one-off compensation allowance for the cost of product and service. It is usually offered to some powerful retailers by one manufacturer to motivate them to provide high level service for its products. The main reasons for the rising of slotting allowances are the scarce characteristics of retailer storage rack and the lack of retailer sale promotions. Slotting allowances can promote the abutment between consumer and product efficiency, and motivate the retailer to offer product promotion. Consequently, it is reasonable that the manufacturer takes slotting allowances as the supplement of channel coordination scheme. In order to achieve the efficient coordination of channels, the paper adopts the game theory to propose the channel coordination strategy mixed by quantity discount and slotting allowances to optimize the channel and partners at the same time. A case study is adopted to check the results. The paper considers the typical channel structure is made up of one manufacturer and two duopoly retailers as research objects. In the first part, it proposes some research hypotheses for the research mode. In the second part, the decision under vertical integration is discussed. The equilibrium results are set as the goal of channel coordination. In the third part, the decision under the pricing mode with the problem of double marginalization is analyzed. The equilibrium results are examined as the evaluation benchmark for channel coordination. The fourth part discusses one typical channel coordination strategy named two-part tariff. The equilibrium results are the evaluation reference for the channel coordination scheme proposed by this study. In the fifth part, the channel coordination strategy mixed by quantity discount and slotting allowances is designed, and the efficiency of the scheme is analyzed. The sixth part adopts one digital case to explain the efficiency of the channel coordination strategy. Finally, the management implications and direction of future research are discussed. Taking the vertical integration as the goal of channel coordination and the pricing mode with the problem of double marginalization as the evaluation benchmark, the paper compares the channel coordination strategy mixed by quantity discount and slotting allowances with two part tariffs. The results show that the channel coordination strategy mixed by quantity discount and slotting allowances can not only optimize the total channel, but also improve the profit of each channel partner synchronously through reasonable slotting allowances. Therefore, the channel coordination strategy proposed by this study is one ideal channel coordination strategy.